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Abstract 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body is the cornerstone of the multilateral trading system. It is instrumental in 
stabilizing the global economy, it is a tool for resolving disputes and enforcing rules related to the organization, 
and makes the trading system safer and predictable. This system is based on clearly defined rules with a 
timetable for the hearing of the case.But this does not prevent the existence of disadvantages related to this body 
in terms of the way it operates and the threats related to the termination of the presence of the Appeal, which in 
turn may lead to the failure of the global system for the settlement of trade disputes between the countries of the 
world. 
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1.Introduction 
In view of the weakness and ineffectiveness of the dispute settlement system under the GATT 1947, it was 
necessary to establish a new system for the settlement of trade disputes in order to avoid the shortcomings and 
gaps in the GATT. 
Therefore, a new system based on effective and specific rules and procedures for the settlement of trade 
disputes between member states was sought. This was achieved in the Uruguay Round, which was in the 
agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, which was signed in Marrakech in 1994. 
The Memorandum of Understanding establishes stricter discipline with regard to the time allowed to settle 
the case as well as flexible deadlines for the various stages of the procedure. He stressed that an early and proper 
solution was essential for the functioning and effectiveness of the WTO.1 
The main change that occurred as a result of the memorandum of understanding on rules and procedures 
governing the conduct of disputes (DSU) was the judicial method of settling disputes through the establishment 
of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the Permanent Appeal Panel, which Symbolized by (AB). 
Settlement of trade disputes is one of the main activities of the WTO. This Convention has established a 
Memorandum of Understanding on the rules and procedures for the dispute settlement process. This system is 
based on the principle of the rule of law in conflict resolution and provides security and predictability in the 
multilateral trading system.2 
Members recognize that this system preserves the rights and obligations of members under the covered 
agreements3 
The Memorandum of Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Conduct of Disputes shall 
include all Members who administer dispute settlement procedures. As such, the DSB will negotiate dispute 
settlement, appoint arbitration teams to resolve disputes, and decide whether to accept or reject the decisions of 
the Permanent Appellate Body (AB). 
The Memorandum of Understanding (DSU) guarantees the implementation of judgments and decisions and 
may authorize punitive measures in case of non-compliance with the rules set out in the Memorandum of 
Understanding.4 
With regard to developing countries, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism promotes equality among 
States in resolving disputes between their members. They are provided with additional legal procedures and 
assistance, which are available throughout the dispute resolution process and the implementation of resolutions 
and recommendations.5  
 
1 . Shaffer, Gregory C. and Elsig, Manfred and Puig, Sergio, The Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement (March 16, 2016). The 
Politics of International Law, eds. Wayne Sandholtz & Christopher Whytock, Oxford University Press, 2016; UC Irvine School of Law 
Research Paper No. 2016-10. Available at SSRN:  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748883 . last accessed on 7 February 2019 
2 Hadi Talaat Hadi Al-Tai, the provisions of the Convention establishing the World Trade Organization and its impact on the development of 
international trade, Dar Arab Renaissance, Cairo, 2013, p. 411. 
3 Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Memorandum of Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes 
4 Whereas Article 21 (7) of the Memorandum of Understanding affirms the rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (DSU); 
"The DSB, when the subject of the issue is a developing country member, should consider what additional measures it can take to suit the 
circumstances." 
5 Available on The WTO website http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c11s2p1_e.htm  last accessed on 25 
December 201 8. 
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Constraints on developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement process are constraints of legal 
knowledge, financial capacity, and political power.1 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism showed criticism and reservations from some WTO members, 
most notably the reservations and observations made by the United States on reform of the WTO dispute 
settlement body system that would upset the rules of the WTO judicial arm upside down.2 
 
2.The criteria adopted for the settlement of disputes: 
2.1 Equity, speed, efficiency and mutually acceptable solution: 
A dispute arises when a country adopts a trade policy or other measure that one or more WTO members consider 
a violation of WTO agreements or a breach of its obligations. Or because of the misinterpretation of the 
provisions of international trade agreements, a third group of States may state that they have an interest in this 
dispute and acquire certain rights. 
Article (21) paragraph (8) of the Memorandum of Understanding stipulates the rules and procedures 
governing the settlement of disputes (DSU) as follows: "The Dispute Settlement Body shall, in cases where the 
case is a developing country member and, when considering appropriate action, may take into account not only 
the commercial agreement covered by the proceedings in question but also its effects on the Developing 
countries are also concerned". 
It should be noted, however, that these judgments are not mandatory and should be considered as a 
recommendation for consideration when the dispute is settled by the arbitration teams.3 
The WTO has one of the most active international dispute settlement mechanisms in the world. Since 1995, 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been active, more than 500 disputes have been submitted to the WTO 
and more than 350 resolutions have been issued.4 
However, it was not a question of judgment but priority was to settle disputes through consultations. As of 
January 2008, the number of cases that have reached the full completion stage is 136 except for other cases 
performed amicably and some cases are still in the extended consultation phase.5 
The WTO dispute settlement system is based on several principles, including adherence to the GATT 1947 
settlement system through the use of independent dispute resolution experts, the use of established procedures 
with previous work experience and the participation of the WTO Secretariat through the provision of technical 
support. To settle immediately and satisfactorily, which requires equality between the rights and duties of 
members.6 It must also respect international trade agreements and the WTO's goal, and act in good faith when 
using settlement procedures, because it is understood that a request for conciliation or dispute settlement is not 
intended to be adversarial and may not be considered as such.7 
The WTO law is based on its statute on the possibility of taking countermeasures against the violating 
member, which is a means of pressure, with the aim of obliging the member whose legislation violates the 
memorandum of understanding to amend it. In addition to strict and automatic deadlines for the adoption of 
Parties' reports, which undoubtedly enhances the security and predictability of the international trading system. 
When the parties to a dispute fail to find a settlement to the dispute, the Arbitration Commission or the 
Permanent Appellate Body is supposed to resolve the dispute amicably8 
The Memorandum of Understanding in Article 2, paragraph 3, emphasized the importance of this system as 
a central element in providing security and predictability in the multilateral trading system. Members recognize 
that this system preserves the rights and obligations of members under the covered agreements, and clarifies the 
existing provisions of these agreements in accordance with the usual rules of interpretation of public 
international law, bearing in mind that the recommendations and decisions of the DSB do not add to the rights 
and obligations set forth in the Agreements covered but not diminished. Article 3 of paragraph (7) also states: "... 
 
1 Bahri A., "Using dispute settlement partnerships for capacity building: Bangladesh’s triumphant experience at WTO DSU", (Journal of 
International Trade Law and Policy, 2019), Available on https://doi.org/10.1108/JITLP-07-2018-0028.  last accessed on 7 February 2019 
2 Gantz, David A., An Existential Threat to WTO Dispute Settlement: Blocking Appointment of Appellate Body Members by the United 
States (July 15, 2018). Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 18-26. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3216633 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3216633.  Last accessed February 7, 2019. 
3 H T Pham, ‘Developing counties and WTO the need for more mediation in the DSU’, 9 Harv. Nrgot. L. Rev.347 2004. 
4 WTO Dispute Settlement: Statistics. Available on The WTO website : https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm   last 
accessed on 6 February 2019 
5 https://www.wto.org/french/thewto_f/whatis_f/tif_f/disp1_f.htm 
6 Article 3, paragraph 3, of the Memorandum of Understanding on the rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes 
7 Article 3, paragraph 10, of the Memorandum of Understanding on the rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes 
8 Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Memorandum of Understanding provides for rules and procedures governing the conduct of disputes to 
prohibit the use of unilateral acts to correct any breach of obligations contained therein (when members seek to correct a breach of 
obligations or other types of cancellation or disruption of interests). Established under the covered agreements, it shall resort to and adhere to 
the rules and procedures of this Understanding. Tetyana Payosova & Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, 2018. "The Dispute 
Settlement Crisis in the World Trade Organization: Causes and Cures," Policy Briefs PB18-5, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics 
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in the absence of an agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to ensure 
that the proceedings concerned are withdrawn if they are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of 
the agreements covered."1 
WTO members agree to use the multilateral dispute settlement system instead of taking unilateral action if 
they believe other members violate trade rules, in other words, states should implement agreed procedures and 
respect their judgments2 
Under the old GATT there was no specific timetable for conflict resolution and it was easy to prevent 
decisions and many cases to continue without a solution. Disputes were settled under the GATT in two ways, 
either through diplomatic negotiations or through judicial settlement or commercial arbitration. 
The WTO has maintained diplomatic means in the settlement of disputes, known in international law as 
conciliation, mediation and good offices.3 
 
2.2 Characteristics of the dispute settlement system: 
The characteristics of the dispute settlement system are multiple: 
Inclusive property: Article 1 of the Memorandum of Understanding provides that the rules and procedures of 
this Understanding shall apply to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Understanding 
on Dispute Resolution and Agreements on Trade in Goods, Services Trade and Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights. 
Prohibition of resorting to unilateral acts: States are bound by the Memorandum of Understanding, that is, 
they cannot resolve their trade dispute based on their domestic law4 
The property of continuity and sustainability: The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body is characterized by a 
lasting nature in terms of work, and is the most efficient organ of the WTO to act swiftly to address urgent trade 
problems, which fall within the WTO's mandate. 
The system is also characterized by the existence of a permanent body of appeal and the application of the 
concept of transparency, so that consultation requests are accessible to all Members of the Organization5 
In case of failure, the members shall circulate the request for settlement to establish the arbitration teams 
and inform the members when the difference report is adopted or rejected by the Appellate Body. Conflicting 
parties shall have the right to access all documents throughout the conflict.6 
Automatic adoption of special group reports, Article 16, paragraph 4, of the Memorandum of 
Understanding states that: “The Panel shall adopt the report of the Panel at one of its meetings within 60 days 
after the date of the circulation of the report to the members unless a Party notifies the Panel of its decision to 
appeal or the Panel decides by consensus not to adopt the report.7 
This text indicates that the Settlement Body automatically adopts the reports of the special teams unless one 
of the parties to the dispute formally informs them of their decision to appeal and does not wish to adopt this 
report. The Uruguay Round Memorandum of Understanding also prevents the State from obstructing the 
adoption of its resolution. 
Under the old GATT procedures, decisions could only be taken by consensus, so that only one opposition 
would be sufficient to prevent them. Decisions are now taken automatically unless there is unanimity in rejecting 
them and therefore any country wishing to block a decision should bring together all other WTO members, 
including the opposing party to the dispute, to take their views. 
The WTO dispute settlement system can be automatic; because of the way it operates on the basis of the 
principle of passive unanimity that the report should be accepted only if it is unanimously rejected, also bearing 
in mind that once the dispute begins, the process cannot be stopped. Settlement without the consent of all parties 
concerned8 
One of the salient features of the WTO dispute settlement system is that decisions reached once adopted by 
the DSB need to be followed or the Permanent Appellate Body9 
 
1 Look at that. Bossche, P., The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation ‘Text, Cases, and Materials’, (2nd ed, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) page 172 
2 Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Memorandum of Understanding provides for rules and procedures governing the conduct of disputes to 
prohibit the use of unilateral acts to correct any breach of the obligations contained therein (when members seek to correct a breach of 
obligations or other types of cancellation or disruption of established interests. Under the Agreements covered, they shall abide by and adhere 
to the rules and procedures of this Understanding. 
3 See Article 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding on rules and procedures governing the conduct of disputes. 
4 See Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Memorandum of Understanding on rules and procedures governing the conduct of disputes 
5 See Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Memorandum of Understanding on rules and procedures governing the conduct of disputes 
6  Galal Wafa Mohammadin, Settlement of International Trade Disputes under GATT Agreements, New University Publishing House, 
Alexandria 2004, p. 24 
7 Article 16, paragraph 4, of the Memorandum of Understanding on the rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes .op.cit. 
8 Yerxa, R., and Wilson, B., Key Issue in WTO Dispute Settlement: First Ten Years, (Cambridge University Press 2005) page 30 
9 . Bossche, P., The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation ‘Text, Cases, and Materials’, (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 
2009) page 178 
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This procedure is very similar to the judicial system, but it is best to encourage the countries concerned to 
discuss their problems and settle the conflict themselves. The first step, therefore, is consultation between the 
Governments concerned, even at later stages, consultation and mediation can always be made, and states can 
only resort to the DSB only after making sure that this is the only option for resolving the dispute. 
Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Memorandum of Understanding states that: “Members shall recognize that 
such a system shall preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the agreements covered. 
This body also has the character of neutrality and independence in terms of form, subject to a specific set of 
legal rules and the existence of specific mechanisms for the functioning of the Dispute Settlement Body, and in 
making its decision independently without objection or external interference. Nor can the WTO dispute 
settlement body intervene in any dispute except with the consent of the conflicting parties. The manifestations of 
such consent are, for example, the possibility of filing lawsuits or resorting to good offices and arbitration to 
settle disputes, which require the consent of the parties in dispute. 
The Rules of Procedure of the DSB shall precisely specify the procedure to be followed and the timetables 
to be followed for the settlement of the dispute, which shall not initially last for more than one year or more than 
15 months if there is an appeal. Agreed deadlines are flexible and in case of emergency (perishable products) the 
procedure is accelerated to the maximum extent possible.1 
The DSU is flexible in this regard. In addition, countries can resolve their differences themselves at any 
time. These are the total figures for dispute resolution. 
60days for consulting and mediation phase. 
45 days to set up the team and appoint group members 
6 months for the submission of the final report of the dispute study team to the parties concerned. 
3weeks to submit final report to WTO members 
60 days for adoption of the report by the DSB (if there is no appeal). 
Total = 1 year (without appeal) 
60-90 days to submit appeal report 
30 days for the adoption of the appeal report by the DSB 
Total = 1 year and 3 months 
 
3.WTO dispute resolution mechanism: 
3.1 WTO dispute resolution phase 
The DSB is a body responsible for resolving trade disputes between WTO members. It has exclusive jurisdiction 
to establish “teams” of experts to examine the case and approve or reject the Commission's conclusions or the 
outcome of the appeal process. It monitors the implementation of decisions and recommendations and takes 
interim measures in case of non-implementation of the obligations .The DSB authorizes the suspension of 
concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements and has the power to authorize action against a 
member who does not comply with a decision. The DSB shall meet as required and as provided in Article 2, 
paragraph 3, of the DSU, and decisions shall be taken by consensus. 
That is, if there is no objection from one of the representatives of the Member States of the Organization 
present at the meeting. 
A member who is absent at this meeting shall not have the right to invoke his opposition to the resolution in 
his absence. 
Conflict resolution has several stages, as follows: 
Stage 1: Consultations (up to 60 days): This phase is diplomatic2 It is a compulsory procedure and a key stage 
for the settlement of disputes before further action and the parties to the conflict must discuss with each other 
whether they can reach an agreement. This procedure is stipulated in Article IV of the Memorandum of 
Understanding and also in Article 4, paragraph 11, of the DSU. 
Paragraph 11 of the same Article has given importance to the activation of the role of consultation by 
saying that if a member of the Consultation is deemed to have a substantial commercial interest in consultations 
held pursuant to Article 22, paragraph 1, of GATT 1994, or Article 22, paragraph 1, of the Agreement other 
covered, This Member may notify the Consultating Members and the Bureau within 10 days from the date of the 
circulation of the request for consultations under the said Article of his desire to join the consultations. In case of 
urgency, the parties shall enter into consultations in less than ten days and if no settlement is reached within 20 
days, the complaining party shall have the right to take further action. 
If this compulsory procedure (consultations) does not work, optional means such as good offices, 
conciliation and mediation under international law may be used. The Director-General of the WTO may be asked 
 
1 Leslie Johns and Krzysztof J. Pelc, "Fear of Crowds in World Trade Organization Disputes: Why Don’t More Countries Participate?," The 
Journal of Politics 78, no. 1 (January 2016): 88-104. 
2  Mohammed Khalil Al-Mousa, Judicial Position of International Organizations, Human Rights, Environment and International Trade 
Settlement Bodies, Wael Publishing House, Amman, 2003, p. 100 
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to intervene as an intermediary or in any other way, but the time limits for consultations must be exhausted 
before any other mechanism is used. 
Phase II: The DSU granted Member States the right to request the establishment of a special committee to 
consider its complaint after the failure of friendly means, (The time limit for establishing the committee is 45 
days and the group has six months to complete its work) 
The offending State may prevent it from doing so for the first time but at the second meeting of the DSB it 
is not entitled to prevent such objection (unless there is a consensus against the establishment of the Special 
Committee).1 
The task of the task force is to assist the DSB in formulating decisions or recommendations. However, since 
its report can only be rejected by consensus in the DSB, it is difficult to reverse its conclusions, which should be 
based on the group's findings through the conventions invoked. 
The final report is sent to the parties to the conflict within six months. In case of emergency, when it comes 
to perishable products, this period is reduced to three months. The Memorandum of Understanding sets out in 
detail the working procedures of the committees and the main steps as follows: 
Before the first meeting, each party to the dispute submits written arguments to the Committee. The first 
meeting relates to the complainant's and defense's arguments to the complaining State or States. Respondent and 
other States expressing interest in the dispute submit their arguments at the first meeting of the Committee, and 
States concerned submit written responses and oral arguments at the second meeting of the Committee. 
If a Party raises scientific or technical issues, the Committee may consult the experts or appoint a group of 
experts to prepare an advisory report. 
The team provides both parties with descriptive sections (facts and arguments) a preliminary draft report 
and gives them two weeks to comment on. This report does not contain findings and conclusions. The 
Committee then submits an interim report containing its findings and conclusions to both parties who have one 
week to request a review. 
The review phase should not exceed two weeks. During this period the committee may hold further 
meetings with the parties. A final report will be sent to both parties and after three weeks it will be distributed to 
all WTO members. 
If the Panel finds that the complaint is in fact inconsistent with the WTO Agreement or the WTO obligation, 
it recommends that this action be taken in accordance with WTO rules and can suggest how to do so. 
This report becomes a decision within 60 days or a recommendation by the DSB unless there is unanimous 
disapproval. Preliminary decisions are taken by the Committee and approved (or rejected) by all WTO members 
with the possibility of challenging these decisions. 
 
3.2 Appeal by appeal: 
Each party may appeal against the decision of the Special Committee and in some cases it may be appealed by 
both parties. The appeal must be based on legal points such as legal interpretations and not a review of existing 
evidence or consideration of new cases. 
The WTO Appellate Body is known as the Permanent Appellate Body (AB), which is set out in Article 16 
of the Memorandum of Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Conduct of Disputes (DSU). 
The members of the Permanent Appellate Body are appointed every four years and are composed of seven 
members representing the majority of WTO membership. The Appellate Body members are experienced in 
international trade and have a reputation and professionalism. Moreover, these members must be free from any 
association of any government.2 
Each appeal is dealt with by three of the seven members of a permanent appeal body established by DSB 
and its representative on a wide range of WTO components. 
The members of the Appellate Body shall be appointed for a term of four years, and shall be persons whose 
authority is recognized in the field of law and international trade and not related to national administration. 
The hearings of the Appellate Body shall be held in private and shall not be attended by the parties, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 17, paragraph 10 of the DSU, which states that “The Appellate Body's 
proceedings shall be confidential in the light of the information and evidence provided. 
The appeal may lead to confirmation, modification or reversal of the Commission's findings and legal 
conclusions, and the duration of the procedure should in principle not exceed 60 days and in any case 90 days. 
The DSB shall accept or reject the Appellate Body's report within 30 days with the possibility of rejection by 
consensus only. 
Decisions of the Appellate Body are final and binding and are generally respected by the parties to the 
conflict. Since its establishment in 1995, the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body has resolved a large number of 
 
1Johns, L., Thrall, C. & Wellhausen, R.L. Rev Int Organ (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09364-y  
2 . UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: SETTLING DISPUTES A unique contribution 
  Available on http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm last accessed on 25 December 201 8. 
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trade disputes and has earned a reputation as the “jewel of the crown” in the world trade system".1 
 
3.3 Implementation of Appellate Body recommendations and decisions: 
Delay in the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the Appellate Body is a violation of the 
decision by the breaching party and must provide compensation or be subject to appropriate and severe 
punishment even if it is not a real punishment, but it is "corrective action" During a certain amount of time to do 
it. 
The Memorandum of Understanding states that "in order to effectively resolve disputes for the benefit of all 
Members it is necessary to comply immediately with the recommendations or provisions of the DSB. 
The DSB shall supervise and supervise the implementation of recommendations and decisions, with the 
right of members to challenge the implementation of recommendations and decisions, even if after adoption 
This appeal is then placed on the DSB's agenda and remains so until it is resolved. Before each DSB 
meeting. The Member concerned should submit a written report detailing the progress made in implementing the 
recommendations.2 
For developing countries, the DSB should improve monitoring of implementation through additional 
actions commensurate with the circumstances3 
However, the Member concerned may claim compensation and suspend the concessions made as an interim 
measure when the recommendations and provisions are not implemented within a reasonable time. 
However, this is no better than the full and proper implementation of the recommendations. Such interim 
measures are implemented to expedite the implementation of recommendations, relying on a punitive procedure 
for such dispute settlement, and can be counterproductive to the complainant. There is no problem in 
implementation if the complaining party is a developed or powerful country, where it can implement without 
thinking of retaliation against the causing State, especially in areas that have nothing to do with international 
trade. 
If a country is a weak state, such as developing or least developed countries, it can implement without 
worrying of retaliation by a country of the same or lesser degree, but it cannot implement in absolute terms if it 
is against a higher state such as developed countries. It has economic, military and political advantages. 
In principle, the State must declare its good faith in implementing the recommendations contained in the 
Panel's report or the Appellate Body's report. And declare its intention to do so at the DSB meeting within 30 
days of the adoption of the report. 
If it is not possible for that country to comply immediately with the recommendation, a reasonable time will 
be given to do so. If the State does not comply during this time, it should enter into negotiations with the 
complaining country or countries in order to find satisfactory compensation for the parties, for example tariff 
reductions in areas of particular interest to the complaining party. 
If satisfactory compensation is not agreed after a period of 20 days, the complainant may request the DSB's 
authorization to retaliate ("suspend ... application of privileges or other obligations"). This procedure, which is 
supposed to be temporary, is aimed at encouraging the other State to comply. For example, this could be to 
prohibit imports by increasing import duties on products from the other country beyond agreed ceilings to high 
levels, so that imported products become too expensive to sell - all within certain limits. 
The DSB must grant such authorization within 30 days of the end of the “reasonable period of time” unless 
there is unanimity in rejecting the request. 
In principle, retaliation should be in the same sector as the subject of the dispute, if that is not possible or 
effective. 
It could target another area of the same convention and if that was not possible and the circumstances were 
too serious, action could be taken under another agreement. The aim is to minimize the likelihood that the action 
will affect other sectors while ensuring its effectiveness.4 
In all cases, the DSB monitors the implementation of the decisions made and the outstanding work remains 
on its agenda until the matter is resolved. 
 
4. Disadvantages of the dispute settlement system By judicial means in the WTO 
The dispute settlement process takes a long period of time, causing economic damage to the complainant, 
especially when the complaint is under consideration. The party making the complaint does not resort to interim 
measures and procedures that protect its interests during the settlement of the dispute5 
 
1 Tetyana Payosova & Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, 2018. "The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the World Trade Organization: 
Causes and Cures," Policy Briefs PB18-5, Peterson Institute for International Economics.2018. 
2 See Article 21, paragraph 6, of the Memorandum of Understanding on rules and procedures governing the conduct of disputes (DSU.( 
3 See Article 21, paragraph 7, of the Memorandum of Understanding on the rules and procedures governing the conduct of disputes (DSU.( 
4 https://www.wto.org/french/thewto_f/whatis_f/tif_f/disp1_f.htm 
5  The World Trade Organisation, A Handbook on WTO Dispute Settlement System, Cambridge University Press. 
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Because there is no compensation system for the winning party to recover the legal expenses it has incurred 
during the course of the proceedings and to claim compensation for the economic losses incurred during the 
settlement of the dispute, which would do great harm to less wealthy developing countries. 
In accordance with Article (22) of the Memorandum of Understanding relating to the rules and procedures 
governing the conduct of disputes (DSU). If the recommendations are not implemented or fail to be implemented 
within the time period specified by the violating State, the Memorandum provides temporary remedies to the 
affected States, such as compensation and suspension of concessions or obligations in the WTO. 
These temporary remedies remain in effect until the violating State has fully implemented the previous 
recommendations, which means that there are no immediate solutions. 
The punitive measures in the WTO, which are taken against the infringing State; the increase in tariffs and 
the application of means of prohibition and restriction through its quotas, licenses and other administrative 
restrictions when applied, shall be observed by observing the rules of international law. 
These procedures are not handled by the DSB itself, but authorize the injured party at its request to do so 
and only convict in the event of violations, which consequently affect the effectiveness of the DSB. 
It is also difficult to consider the extent to which the DSB is impartial, especially if this body operates 
within the framework of a global trade organization composed of Member States and the President including. 
Where the interests are conflicting, in addition to the domination and dominance of the major powers on the 
organs of this organization. This dominance is one of the most serious destructive factors in the settlement of 
disputes, all of which affect the character of neutrality.1 
Consultations at the mandatory stage may not be fair if solutions are found to the economic and political 
imbalance between the negotiating parties, which may comply with the conditions of the developed countries for 
fear of harming their economic interests. 
With regard to the independence of the DSB, this status may cease to exist in the case of backward or 
negative consensus. This is also evidenced by its structure and organizational structure because there is a formal 
separation between the Dispute Settlement Body and the General Council of the Organization, where each body 
has its own independent President. 
The negative approach to consensus and decision-making in the WTO, especially within the settlement 
system, is by consensus or the so-called negative consensus. Any adoption of a resolution under the OPCW is 
virtually automatic. The only way that might impede the adoption of the resolution would be unanimous 
approval by the member states of the organ, including the complaining State. 
This means that if only one country does not agree to the negative consensus and does not join the 
resolution, the resolution must be adopted2 
A key challenge to the WTO's Permanent Appellate Body is US reservations that could threaten and destroy 
the WTO dispute settlement system.3 
The US disability related to Appellate Body appointments has reduced the number of seven members to just 
three (from the USA, China and India).4 This is the minimum requirement for the settlement of trade disputes 
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 
When the mandate of two of these three expires on December 10, 2019, there will be no legally existing 
appellate body to adjudicate disputes between WTO members. 
The reservations raised by the United States of America several months ago are aimed at impeding the 
extension of the term of office of some members of the Appellate Body for a second session, or the appointment 
of new members to fill vacant posts. Some countries have described this current US tactic as obstructing 
appellate panel appointments as "taken as hostages".5 Ultimately, targeting the Appellate Body will destroy the 
entire WTO dispute settlement system. 
The United States has opposed, because of its failure since July 2017, to approve the renewal or acceptance 
of new appointments to the Appellate Body. 
The first difficulties emerged under the Obama administration in 2016, as the United States opposed the re-
election of Korean member "Seung. Wha Chang".6 The post has been vacant since then. As well as the position 
 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s1p1_e.htm  last accessed on 25 December 201 8. 
1 Chaalal Nawal, Settlement of Disputes within the World Trade Organization, Memorandum for Masters in Law, Faculty of Law and 
Political Science, Akli Mohamed and Lahj University, Bouira 2016, p. 63 
2 Galal Wafa Mohammadin, Settlement of International Trade Disputes within the GATT Agreement, New University Publishing House, 
Alexandria, 2004, pp. 29-30 
3 . Gantz, David A., An Existential Threat to WTO Dispute Settlement: Blocking Appointment of Appellate Body Members by the United 
States (July 15, 2018). Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 18-26. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3216633 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3216633.  Last accessed February 7, 2019. 
4 . Ibid. 
5 Tetyana Payosova & Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, (2018). "The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the World Trade Organization: 
Causes and Cures," Policy Briefs PB18-5, Peterson Institute for International Economics (2018). 
6 Primo Braga, B. M. Hoe  (ed.), Future of the Global Trade Order, Florence : European University Instite 2th. Ed. 2017, p. 122 ; J. Bacchus, 
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of two other members whose terms have expired, Mexican Ricardo Ramirez-Hernandez since June 30, 2017 and 
Belgian Peter Van den Bossche since December 11, 2017, and ended the mandate of S Baboo Chekitan 
Servansing, Republic of République de Mauric Mauritius on 30 September 2018 Who will most likely remain 
the current Indian President of the Appellate Body until December 10, 2019, Ujal Singh Bhatia, and American 
Thomas R. Graham, whose term expires on the same date as the Chinese Hong Zhao On November 30, 2020. 
The United States offered several reasons to support its refusal to provide seats. It denounced the appeals 
court's alleged judicial activity against the United States and the systematic abuse of its mandate, as well as its 
responsibility towards members.1 
The discussion then focused on questioning Article 15 of the Appeal Working Procedure, which states that 
a person who is no longer a member of the Appellate Body, with the permission of the Appellate Body and upon 
notification from the Board, may complete the examination of any appeal that was assigned to him when Only 
that person will still be considered as a member of the Appellate Body. The United States representative to the 
World Trade Organization cannot accept this principle. 
The new member is the one who has the responsibility to continue to participate in the appeal procedures.2 
 
5. Conclusion 
Due to the inability of the GATT to settle trade disputes between the Contracting States due to its lack of 
obligation and the development of appropriate solutions and to deter States from taking unilateral and unilateral 
measures outside the scope of the Agreement. 
A new round of negotiations was needed to overcome all previous difficulties, including the establishment 
of an effective dispute settlement system and the settlement of trade in services. 
The scope of competence of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Its terms of reference may be determined 
in two respects: The first is disputes that arise between members of the organization due to breach of the 
agreement establishing the organization. The second is trade disputes arising from multilateral trade agreements. 
Special teams also do not have the power to make final judgments in the disputes before them, but only to 
report on their findings in that dispute. 
If courts are assigned a growing number of criminal cases, does this not mean that law and order are abused. 
On the contrary, this sometimes means that people have greater confidence in the courts and in the rule of law, 
and that the failure of the WTO serves no one, so that commercial disputes must be settled in accordance with 
internationally agreed rules. 
 
Recommendations 
1-The WTO should not consider the negotiation mechanism as a mandatory means of settling disputes before 
further action, but rather as an optional means. 
2-Extending the jurisdiction of the Permanent Appeals Body to include all its material and legal aspects of the 
disputes submitted to it. The appeal of the reports of the Special Teams is not limited to the legal aspects, since 
commercial disputes are often confused so that it is difficult to distinguish between legal and factual, so it should 
have been an appeal to reconsider the dispute. In all its aspects. 
3- The need to give special teams the power to make judgments in the disputes before them, and not just write a 
report of the results reached in that dispute. 
4- The Dispute Settlement Body shall provide for the punishment or actions taken against the injuring State itself 
by providing a specialized executive body of the World Trade Organization to implement the decisions and 
recommendations in imposing the sanction or action against the causing State. 
5- The WTO dispute settlement system should provide a compensation system for legal expenses and expenses 
incurred during the dispute. 
6- WTO members should develop an effective means of reforming the crises that the WTO is going through, 
especially in the Feminist Dispute and Permanent Appeals Body. The reservations made by the United States of 
America, if they continue to do so, especially with regard to the appointment of new members of the Permanent 
Appellate Body, will inevitably lead to the destruction of an organ, system and a world trade organization that 
has maintained economic and trade stability among many countries by nearly Seventy years. 
7- The need to amend the system of special treatment items among members, as a result of its negative effects on 
developing countries. 
 
References 
WTO Dispute Settlement: Statistics. Available on The WTO website : 
 
Sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.173.pdfl)..                  
1 (v. G. Sacerdoti, The WTO in 2017 : Systemic Developments, Disputes and Review of the Appellate Body's and Panels Reports, Bocconi 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, no3158379, April 2018, p.5 [https://ssrn.com/abstract=3158379]). 
2 WT/DSB/M/404, 6 mars 2018.$7.6). 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online)  
Vol.91, 2019 
 
94 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm   last accessed on 6 February 2019 
https://www.wto.org/french/thewto_f/whatis_f/tif_f/disp1_f.htm 
Available on The WTO website 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c11s2p1_e.htm  last accessed on 25 
December 201 8. 
Bahri A., "Using dispute settlement partnerships for capacity building: Bangladesh’s triumphant experience at 
WTO DSU", (Journal of International Trade Law and Policy, 2019), Available on 
https://doi.org/10.1108/JITLP-07-2018-0028.  last accessed on 7 February 2019 
H T Pham, ‘Developing counties and WTO the need for more mediation in the DSU’, 9 Harv. Nrgot. L. Rev.347 
2004. 
Gantz, David A., An Existential Threat to WTO Dispute Settlement: Blocking Appointment of Appellate Body 
Members by the United States (July 15, 2018). Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 18-26. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3216633 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3216633.  Last 
accessed February 7, 2019 
Tetyana Payosova & Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, 2018. "The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the 
World Trade Organization: Causes and Cures," Policy Briefs PB18-5, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. 
Bossche, P., The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation ‘Text, Cases, and Materials’, (2nd ed, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) page 172 
Shaffer, Gregory C. and Elsig, Manfred and Puig, Sergio, The Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement 
(March 16, 2016). The Politics of International Law, eds. Wayne Sandholtz & Christopher Whytock, 
Oxford University Press, 2016; UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2016-10. Available at SSRN:  
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748883 . last accessed on 7 February 2019 
Leslie Johns and Krzysztof J. Pelc, "Fear of Crowds in World Trade Organization Disputes: Why Don’t More 
Countries Participate?," The Journal of Politics 78, no. 1 (January 2016): 88-104. 
Johns, L., Thrall, C. & Wellhausen, R.L. Rev Int Organ (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09364-y 
Yerxa, R., and Wilson, B., Key Issue in WTO Dispute Settlement: First Ten Years, (Cambridge University Press 
2005) page 30. 
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: SETTLING DISPUTES A unique contribution¸Available on 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm last accessed on 25 December 201 8. 
Tetyana Payosova & Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, 2018. "The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the 
World Trade Organization: Causes and Cures," Policy Briefs PB18-5, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics.2018. 
https://www.wto.org/french/thewto_f/whatis_f/tif_f/disp1_f.htm 
The World Trade Organisation, A Handbook on WTO Dispute Settlement System, Cambridge University Press. 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s1p1_e.htm  last accessed on 25 
December 201 8. 
Gantz, David A., An Existential Threat to WTO Dispute Settlement: Blocking Appointment of Appellate Body 
Members by the United States (July 15, 2018). Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 18-26. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3216633 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3216633.  Last 
accessed February 7, 2019. 
Tetyana Payosova & Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, (2018). "The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the 
World Trade Organization: Causes and Cures," Policy Briefs PB18-5, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics (2018). 
Primo Braga, B. M. Hoe  (ed.), Future of the Global Trade Order, Florence : European University Instite 2th. Ed. 
2017, p. 122 ; J. Bacchus, Might Unmakes Right. The American Assault on the of Law in World Trade, 
CIGI Papers no 173, May 2018, p. 22, [www. Sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.173.pdfl).. 
v. G. Sacerdoti, The WTO in 2017 : Systemic Developments, Disputes and Review of the Appellate Body's and 
Panels Reports, Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper Series, no3158379, April 2018, p.5 
[https://ssrn.com/abstract=3158379]). 
WT/DSB/M/404, 6 mars 2018.$7.6). 
 
